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Abstract 
In this paper, we analyse whether the likelihood of the bank-firm relationships ending is 
dependent on their age or not and whether the respective behaviour is smooth or changes over their 
length. A parametric duration analysis is employed in this analysis. We start by estimating a 
continuous-time Weibull duration model over the duration of the relationships between 1185 firms 
and one of the major French banks. Our findings show that the likelihood of the relationships 
between them ending increases over their duration, but other specific factors to the firms, to the 
bank, to their own relationship and certain pricing conditions also play an important role in the 
duration of those relationships. 
Additionally, we extend the baseline Weibull duration model in order to allow for change-
points in the duration dependence parameter. The empirical findings support the presence of a 
change-point: positive duration dependence is observed for those relationships that last less than 23 
years, but no evidence of duration dependence is found for longer events. Hence, we conclude that 
the likelihood of these relationships ending increases over time, but only until about 23 years of 
duration; then the relations become stronger and the likelihood of they ending is no longer 
dependent on its duration but on other conditionings. 
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1. Introduction 
One of the most important roles of banks, that explain their presence in the 
economy, is their capacity to reduce information asymmetry in the credit market (Diamond, 
1984). This feature of the banking sector relies on the capacity of financial institutions to 
build up long-term relationships with opaque customers such as small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SME), through which they collect private information about them in order to 
cope with the information asymmetry problem. Indeed, following repeated interactions with 
firms over time, banks accumulate private information – especially soft information – and 
build up closer relationships with them (Boot, 2000). Therefore, thanks to these lending 
relationships, inefficiencies linked to the imperfections of information between lenders and 
borrowers will be reduced and this will allow banks to deal with misleading decisions and 
reduce credit rationing problems (Diamond, 1984; Allen, 1990; Boot, 2000). 
Applied empirical analyses have used several indicator variables to identify the 
lender-borrower relationships. Common proxies for these relationships are: (i) the duration 
of those relationships (the length); (ii) the strength of the lender-borrower ties, measured by 
the number of products and services provided by banks to their client (the breadth); (iii) and 
the number of firms‟ bank relationships (the exclusivity). These variables are introduced to 
analyze the effect of the relationships intensity on the availability, terms, and quality of 
corporate loans (Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Degryse and Cayseele, 2000; Elsas, 2005; 
Cotugno et al., 2013). Despite this field comprise a large number of empirical works, only a 
few studies investigate the determinants and characteristics of those variables on banking 
relationships. A duration analysis is employed by Ongena and Smith (2001a), Karceski et 
al., (2005) and Farinha and Santos (2002) to explore the effect of firm-specific variables on 
the likelihood of bank relationships ending or switching from single to multiple ones. They 
find that those likelihoods tend to rise with the length of those relationships. Furthermore, 
they also show that profitable, highly leveraged and small firms, as well as those with 
multiple bank relationships, maintain shorter bank relationships. However, these findings 
are contradicted by some studies, in particular, because opaque borrowers – such as small 
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and medium-sized firms – tend to become trapped in their relationships with the respective 
banks due to their informational constrains and large switching costs (Sharpe, 1990; Kim et 
al., 2003; Von Thadden, 2004; Gehrig and Stenbacka, 2007). 
The purpose of this study is to contribute to this small strand of the empirical 
literature on the determinants of the bank-firm relationships. Our analysis complements and 
extends the existent empirical works in several ways. First, following Ongena and Smith 
(2001a) and Karceski et al., (2005), we use a duration analysis to explore the determinants 
of the likelihood of a bank-firm relationship ending. Second, we improve upon Ongena and 
Smith‟s (2001a) and Karceski et al., (2005) work in terms of the econometric method used 
and by adding a range of time-series relationship-specific information about the lender and 
their clients: important firm and bank specific characteristics, pricing and economic 
conditions are considered in this analysis. Third, we go a step forward in testing whether 
the likelihood of bank-firm relationships are duration dependent or not, i.e., whether the 
likelihood of they ending is increasing or decreasing (or stable) over time and try to identify 
the similarities (or differences) with respect to firm size. Fourth, this study provides, for the 
first time in this field of research, an analysis to the presence of change-points in the 
duration of the bank-firm relationships, i.e. we test whether the degree of the likelihood of a 
relationship ending as it gets older may change after a given duration. 
To address these issues, we estimate a Weibull duration model over the duration of 
the relationships between 1185 firms and an important French bank. Our findings show that 
the likelihood of those relationships ending increases over their duration, which confirms 
the evidence provided by Ongena and Smith (2001a) and Karceski et al., (2005) for a group 
of Norwegian firms. Other specific factors to the firms, to the bank, to their relationship and 
pricing conditions have also showed to play an important role in the duration of those 
relationships. 
Next, we extend the baseline Weibull duration model in order to allow for the 
presence of a change-point in the duration dependence parameter. This novel approach 
provides interesting results supporting for its presence: positive duration dependence is 
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observed for those relations that last less than 23 years, but negative or no duration 
dependence is found for longer events. This means that bank-firm relationships become 
stronger when they last more than a quarter of a century and, from there onwards, other 
factors may play a more detrimental role in their duration than their own age. This 
represents a remarkable new finding to the literature which contributes to a better 
understanding of the duration of bank-firm relationships. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing 
literature on banks and firms relationships. Section 3 presents the econometric models. 
Section 4 describes the data and the variables. The empirical analysis and the discussion of 
the results are presented in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Literature Review 
Financial intermediation literature proposes several definitions for the firm-bank 
relationship (Berger, 1999; Boot, 2000; Berger and Udell, 2002). Boot (2000) defines the 
lender-borrower relationship as the supply of financial services by a financial institution 
that has the following characteristics: (i) on the one hand, the lender must invest in getting 
borrower-specific information; (ii) on the other hand, the lender has to assess the relevance 
of these investments throughout multiple interactions with the same borrower over time and 
across various products.  
Existing literature emphasizes on the one hand both the advantages and 
disadvantages of relationship lending and on the other hand investigates the effect of bank-
firm relationships on the firms‟ loan conditions. These studies show that the length of the 
relationship lending improves the credit availability for the firms (e.g. Petersen and Rajan, 
1994) even during a credit crunch period (Cotugno et al., 2013), and reduces the likelihood 
of firms to provide collateral (e.g. Pazzolo, 2004). However the impact of long-term 
relationships on the credit cost is not obvious in the literature. Some empirical works find 
that credit cost rises as the length of banking relationship increases (e.g. Degryse and 
 5 
Ongena, 2005), while other analysis show a negative link between the relationship lending 
and loan pricing (e.g. Berger et al, 2007). 
Empirical studies on the field of relationship lending combine several indicator 
variables to identify the lender-borrower relationship. The duration of bank-borrower 
relationship is the most frequently used in empirical work (e.g. Degryse and Ongena, 2007; 
Bellucci et al., 2013). The underlying idea is that the intensity of the relationship between 
the bank and its customer increases with time across multiple contacts between them during 
this period. These multiple interactions with its borrower allow the bank to gather private 
information, reduce information asymmetry and strengthen the relationship with the 
borrower. The second proxy commonly used by empirical literature to characterize the 
strength of relationship between a lender and its borrower is the exclusivity of the 
relationship between the firm and the bank. The use of this variable by applied empirical 
studies is based on the presumption that because of exclusivity the relational lenders benefit 
from a softening of banking competition. This encourages the bank to invest more in 
obtaining customer-specific information, and these results in a better collection and use of 
valuable private information, which promotes the development of close ties between the 
lender and the firm. Hence, exclusivity facilitates the achievement of the economic 
advantages of the lending relationship (e.g. Petersen and Rajan 1995; Cotugno et al., 2013). 
The last variable used by literature to analyze this issue measures the breadth of the firm-
lender relationship by considering the scope of this tie through the number of services 
provided by the bank to the borrower. The use of this variable is consistent with the notion 
that multiple interactions with the borrower, often through providing multiple financial 
services, allows banks to accumulate additional information on the borrower that improves 
their ability to assess and monitor customers (e.g. Degryse and Cayseele, 2000; Bellucci et 
al., 2013). 
Thereby, the studies in the field of lender-borrower relationships fosters extensive 
works that explore the advantages and disadvantages of lending relationships for firms as 
well as the effect of relationship intensity on the availability, conditions and quality of 
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corporate loans. However, only few studies investigate the determinants of the proxies used 
to identify the firm-borrower relationship. Thus, our analysis complements and extends the 
results of works exploring the key factors of bank-firm relationships. By assessing the 
determinants of the length of bank-firm relationships with a proper duration analysis, we 
think we contributed relevantly to this studies filed on one of its most important 
dimensions. 
Having flourished in the engineering and medical fields, the duration analysis 
rapidly spread out to other sciences. In economics, it started to be employed in labour 
economics to assess the duration of periods of unemployment.
1
 It has also been widely used 
in the analysis of the duration of the business cycle phases.
2
 A basic Weibull model is 
usually employed in those studies with the aim of finding duration dependence in the 
phases of the business cycle, i.e. whether the likelihood of expansions and recessions 
ending is dependent on its age or not. However, this model assumes that the behaviour of 
duration dependence is smooth over the entire duration of the event, which may not be true. 
Given this limitation, Castro (2013) adapts the Weibull model with change-points proposed 
by Lara-Porras et al. (2005) to the analysis of the duration of the business cycle phases. 
This author shows that positive duration dependence in expansions is no longer present 
when they last more than ten years, which proves the presence of a change-point in the 
duration of economic expansions. 
Other studies also show the presence of duration dependence in different 
dimensions of the economy. Bracke (2011) and Cunningham and Kolet (2011) show that 
the likelihood of housing booms and busts ending is positively dependent on its age. More 
recently, Agnello et al. (2013) provide some evidence indicating that fiscal consolidations 
are also duration dependent and Castro and Kubota (2013) uncover the presence of positive 
duration dependence in credit booms. On the political field, Castro and Martins (2013) also 
                                               
1
 See Allison (1982) and Kiefer (1988) for a review of the literature on duration analysis. 
2 See, for example, Sichel (1991), Zuehlke (2003), Davig (2007) and Castro (2010, 2013). 
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find positive duration dependence in local governments‟ tenure, i.e. the more time a party 
remains in office, the higher is the likelihood of leaving it. 
Due to its properties, this kind of analysis is also suitable for studying the duration 
of bank-firm relationships. Hence, we employ a Weibull model to investigate the presence 
of duration dependence in a large group of bank-firm relationships. Additionally, we also 
control for the presence of change-points in the structure of the model. In the next section, 
we describe the application of these models to this study. This analysis represents an 
important contribution to the economic literature in this field and it intends to contribute to 
a better understanding of those relations. 
 
3. Econometric models 
In this section, we describe the duration models employed in the empirical analysis. 
The general aspects of a duration analysis are described first, followed by the description of 
the basic Weibull model and its extension to the case where change-points are allowed. 
 
3.1. Duration analysis 
The duration variable is defined as the number of periods (months) a hank-firm 
relationship lasts. If T measures the time span between the beginning of a relation and its 
end, then t1, t2,…,tn will represent its observed duration. The probability distribution of the 
duration variable, T, can be specified by the cumulative distribution function, F(t)=Pr(T<t), 
and the corresponding density function is f(t)=dF(t)/dt. Alternatively, the distribution of T 
can be characterized by the survivor function, S(t)=Pr(T≥t)=1-F(t), which measures the 
probability that the duration of a relationship is larger or equal to t. 
A particularly useful function for duration analysis is the hazard function, 
)(/)()( tStfth  , which measures the rate at which the bank-firm relationship spells end at 
time t, given that they lasted until that moment. In other words, it measures the probability 
of exiting from a state in moment t conditional on the length of time in that state. This 
function helps to characterize the path of duration dependence. For instance: (i) if 
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dh(t)/dt>0 for t=t
*
, there is positive duration dependence in t
*
; (ii) if dh(t)/dt<0 for t=t
*
, 
then there is negative duration dependence in t
*
; and (iii) if dh(t)/dt=0 for t=t
*
, there is no 
duration dependence. Therefore, when the derivative of the hazard function with respect to 
time is positive, the probability of a relationship ending in moment t, given that it has lasted 
until t
*
, increases with its age. Thus, the longer the relationship is, the higher the 
conditional probability of its end will be. 
From the hazard function, we can derive the integrated hazard function, 

t
duuhtH
0
)()( , and compute the survivor function, )](exp[)( tHtS  . While different 
parametric continuous-time duration models can measure the magnitude of duration 
dependence and the impact of other time-invariant variables on the likelihood of an event 
ending, the most commonly used functional form of the hazard function is the proportional 
hazard model: 
)exp()(),( 0 xβthxth      (1) 
where h0(t) is the baseline hazard function that captures the data dependence of duration 
and represents an unknown parameter to be estimated, β is a (k×1) vector of parameters that 
need to be estimated and x is a vector of covariates. The proportional hazard model can be 
estimated without imposing any specific functional form to the baseline hazard function 
(the so called "Cox model"). Given the inappropriateness of this procedure (in particular, 
for studying duration dependence), a popular alternative imposes a specific parametric form 
for the function h0(t), i.e. the "Weibull model". 
 
3.2. The basic Weibull model 
The Weibull model is characterized by the following (baseline) hazard function: 
1
0 )(
 pptth        (2) 
where p parameterizes the duration dependence, t denotes time, γ is a constant; moreover, 
p>0 and γ>0. If p>1, the conditional probability of a relationship ending increases as the it 
gets older, i.e. there is positive duration dependence; if p<1 there is negative duration 
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dependence; finally, there is no duration dependence if p=1.
3
 Therefore, by estimating p, 
we can test for the presence of duration dependence in the bank-firm relationships. 
Inserting the Weibull specification for the baseline hazard function, as expressed by 
equation (2), in the proportional hazard function denoted by (1), we get: 
)exp(),( 1 xβ pptxth      (3) 
Hence, the corresponding survivor function can be written as: 
)]exp(exp[),( xβx pttS      (4) 
This model can be estimated by Maximum Likelihood and the log-likelihood function, for a 
sample of i=1,…,n bank-firm relationships, is given by: 






n
i
i
p
iiii
n
i
iiiii
ttppc
tSthcL
1
1
)]exp()ln)1(ln(ln[
)](ln),(ln[)(ln
βxβx
xx

 (5) 
where ci indicates when observations are censored. If the relationship remains until the end 
of the sample period under analysis (March 2013), those observations are censored (i.e. 
ci=0); when they are broken during the sample period, they are not censored (in that case, 
ci=1). 
 
3.3. A Weibull model with change-points 
While the basic structure of the log-likelihood function for the Weibull model 
allows us to analyze the presence of duration dependence in the bank-firm relationships, we 
also move a step further in that we assess the extent to which the likelihood of a 
relationship ending as it gets older changes after a certain duration. Thus, we allow for the 
possibility of a structural break in the Weibull model and conjecture that the parameters of 
the baseline hazard function (p and γ) can change at a certain point (i.e. the "change-point") 
in time. In particular, we expect that the degree of duration dependence, p, changes after the 
                                               
3 In this third case, the Weibull model is equal to an Exponential model. 
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event has lasted more than a certain time. Consequently, we do not only expect that the 
likelihood of a bank-firm relationship ending increases over time, but also that if it has 
lasted more than a certain time, the likelihood of ending may change significantly after that 
point, that is, the magnitude of duration dependence may decrease or increase from that 
point onwards. 
We propose here an alternative Weibull model, for the duration of bank-firm 
relationships, with a change-point that follows the general model framework developed by 
Lara-Porras et al. (2005) and Castro (2013) for cases where the Weibull distribution, or the 
respective parameters characterizing the baseline hazard function, varies over time for 
different intervals, but remain constant within each interval. For simplicity, let us re-write 
equation (2) as: 
11
0 )()(
  pp tpptth      (6) 
where γ=λp. Hence, the survival function becomes: 
)]exp()(exp[),( xβx pttS     (7) 
Denoting g(t)=lnH(t) and considering a change point, τc, and two intervals, t0<t≤τc 
and τc<t≤tT, g(t) can be expressed as: 
jp
jttg )ln()(       (8) 
with j=1 or j=2. Due to the fact that the continuity of g(t) in the change-point, τc, has to be 
verified, we must impose that: 
21 )ln()ln( 21
p
c
p
c       (9) 
Solving this equation with respect to p2, we get: 
)ln(
)ln(
2
1
12
c
cpp


      (10) 
Consequently, in the case of the survival time ending in the first interval, we have: 
)ln()( 111 tptg j       (11) 
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and, similarly, for the survival time ending in the second interval: 
)ln(
)ln(
)ln(
)ln()( 2
2
1
1222 tptptg
c
c
j 


     (12) 
Considering the i-th spell (or relationship), we get: 
)ln(
)ln(
)ln(
)1()ln()( 2
2
1
111 i
c
c
iii tpdtpdtg 


    (13) 
where di=1 if j=1 or, more precisely, t0<t≤τc, di=0 if j=2, i.e. τc<t≤tT, and i=1,2,...,n, i.e. 
the number of relationships identified in our dataset. 
Since H(ti,xi)=exp[g(ti)+xiβ], the hazard function is, therefore, given by: 
),(
)ln(
)ln(
)1(
),()('/),(),(
2
111
ii
c
c
i
i
i
i
iiiiiiii
tH
t
p
d
t
p
d
tHtgdttdHth
x
xxx




  (14) 
Attending to the relation between the survivor function and the integrated hazard, 
)],(exp[),( iiii tHtS xx  , the log-likelihood function can be written as: 



n
i
iiiiii tgtgtgcL
1
]})(exp[])()('[ln{)(ln βxβx   (15) 
where 
)ln(
)ln(
)1()('
2
111
c
c
i
i
i
i
t
t
t
p
d
t
p
dtg


 . This model is estimated by Maximum 
Likelihood, given a particular change-point τc. The relevance of the change-point is 
evaluated by testing whether there is a statistically significant difference between p1 and p2, 
i.e. whether the duration dependence parameter changes significantly between the two sub-
periods. 
 
4. Data and definition of the variables 
The dataset used in this study is unique and is retrieved mainly from one of the 
major universal French banks. The French economy is well suited to deal with this issue 
given that it is a bank-based financial economy where bank financing predominates. We got 
access to a random sample of 3616 annual loan officers‟ credit assessment reports about 
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firms‟ credit worthiness over the period from January 2008 to the end of March 2013. The 
loan officer‟s credit assessment report is a document, produced annually by the loan officer 
in charge of managing the customer relationship in order to evaluate the creditworthiness of 
the firms. The document contains relevant updated data about the bank-firm relationship 
and includes a loan officer analysis on the financial health of the enterprise as well as 
information regarding the business side of the relationship. This document is considered as 
one of risk management tools used by the bank for corporate market. It is also used by the 
loan officer for monitoring the bank‟s commitments with the clients. For each new firm‟s 
relationship, the credit assessment report is prepared. The report must be updated at least 
once a year by the loan officers, managing the relationship within the framework of regular 
monitoring of counterparties as well as in the case of a new firms‟ funding. Our data 
concerns loan officers‟ assessment of the corporate relationship in the framework of the 
annual update or in case of newly granted credit. Therefore, through loan officer‟s credit 
assessment report, we got access to detailed information on various firm-level 
characteristics, pricing conditions, and individual bank-borrower relationship variables over 
time. Further, we also obtain data regarding the bank market power on the corporate credit 
market. Thus, we get information on the bank‟s market share of corporate loans relative to 
the geographical location of the firms‟ in tie with the bank over the studied period. This 
information is quarterly data provided by the French Central Bank to each bank granting 
credit at the level of French department (geographical location). We also use information 
from Bankscope database provided by the Bureau Van Dijk to calculate the Lerner index of the 
bank. Finally, we use DIANE database, a database about French firms to access information 
on some firm‟s specific characteristics as well as firm‟s balance sheets. The SIREN number 
was used to identify each firm‟ present in our dataset in DIANE database. The database 
used in this study concerns only firms that are considered as opaque and subject to a high 
level of information asymmetry. This feature of the firms increases their reliance to banks 
loans and therefore leading to relationship lending technology. In the data set, every 
relationship is managed by banks‟ loan officers in terms of screening firms‟ credit 
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application and monitoring outstanding loans. Indeed, recent studies emphasize the role of 
bank-loan officers in producing private information, the key element of the bank-firm 
relationships (e.g. Bouchellal, 2013; Uchida et al., 2012). Furthermore, the organizational 
structure of the bank from which we collect data, allows the gathering of customer-private 
information that is important element to establish and maintain firm-bank relationships 
(e.g., Stein, 2002; Berger and Udell, 2002; Berger et al., 2005). It is clear that the use of 
data retrieved from one bank presents some limitations because it does not allow us to 
consider different bank behaviors in French corporate loan market. However, it seems that 
this is the only way to collect very detailed and accurate information relative to this issue 
given the privacy of the borrower-lender relationship. 
Finally, the complete database contains 1185 observations. Each observation 
represents one firm-bank relationship and for each one, the duration of its relationship with 
the bank is computed. The dataset includes 303 observations related to large firms and 882 
observations concerning small-and medium-sized enterprises (SME). We define the 
duration relationship as the number of consecutive months from the date of the relationship 
beginning to the date of loan officer‟s assessment. Bank‟s corporate department produces 
every month, the list of the financial institution‟s remaining firm relationships. Once, the 
firm is dropped from the bank‟s list clients, it is identified, to have ended the relationship 
with bank. We find such 92 bank-firm relationships in our sample from January 2008 to the 
end of March 2013. 
Our objective is to examine whether the likelihood of the bank-firm relationship 
ending depends on the length of time that the relationship lasts, i.e. whether there is 
duration dependence or not. For this purpose, we employ a parametric duration analysis. 
However, besides the presence of duration dependence, other variables may influence the 
duration of the bank-firm relationship. For each relationship spell we extract information on 
various firm-level characteristics, lender market power, pricing conditions, individual bank-
borrower relationship variables, and business climate. The list of variables used in this 
study, the respective description and expected signs are presented in Table 1. 
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[Insert Table 1 around here] 
 
The first group of variables to be considered is related to the characteristics of the 
firm: size, age, sector, turnover, profit, default probability and transparency. In order to 
distinguish between large firms and small-and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in our 
sample we use a dummy variable that takes value 1 when the firm is large and 0 otherwise 
(LargeFirm). We follow the EU definition of large companies so a firm is considered as 
large when it has more than 250 employees. Large firms are usually more transparent which 
reduces their reliance on bank funding and enables them to start a new bank relationship 
more easily. Moreover, they also, enjoy higher bargaining power to negotiate with the bank 
for its best interest and they can also be offered better conditions by other banks that see as 
an opportunity to have them in their portfolio. Furthermore, the monitoring of large firms is 
based on the use of public information, “hard information”, which does not strengthen the 
tie with the customers (e.g. Berger et al., 2005). Thus, we expect that the bank-firm 
relationship can be shorter when large firms are involved in a relationship with a bank. 
The age of a firm (FirmAge) may also be closely linked to the duration of its 
relationship with a bank but its effect remains ambiguous. Older firms are usually more 
stable and integrated in the market, so the risk of disappearing or shutting down is lower. 
This facilitates the establishment of new relationships for older firms. Hence, we may 
expect that the age of firm has a positive effect on the probability of ending an existing 
relationship. However, firms‟ age facilitates various types of information exchange between 
the borrower and the lender, thus when firms survive in the market and accumulate a 
significant repayment history, these older firms develop a good reputation and  tend to 
benefit from greater credit availability and better credit terms than the younger ones 
(Petersen and Rajan,1995, Sakai et al.,2010). Therefore, a firm‟s age may make the 
relationship longer. 
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Regarding the sector in which the firm is operating, we do not have any prior 
expectation on whether it may have a positive or negative impact on the duration of the 
relationship. To control for those possible sector effects, we aggregate the firms into five 
sectors: commerce (Trade), industrial (Indus), services (Serv), construction (Constr) and 
agriculture (AAI). Consequently, five dummies were generated and the first four are 
included in the model, keeping the AAI as the basis category. 
We control for the effect of firms‟ size and profit by measuring, respectively, the 
impact of the firm‟s logarithm of the turnover (LnTurn) and logarithm of profitability 
(LnProfit) on the duration of the bank-firm relationship. The firm‟s turnover and 
profitability provide an indication of the firm‟s ability to generate resources and to repay its 
loans. These two aspects allow firms with high turnover and profitability to enhance their 
pricing conditions and to suffer less from “the hold-up problem”. Thus, we may expect a 
negative sign for the coefficient, which means that firms with a higher turnover and/or 
higher profits tend to have a longer relationship with the bank. 
The probability of default (DefaultProb), the result of the bank‟s internal credit 
rating computed by loan officers using soft and hard information at their disposal, is 
another specific characteristic of a firm that may have an impact on the duration of the 
bank-firm relationship. Indeed, this procedure involves the use of audited financial 
statements of firms, tax return and payment information, as well as non-financial factors 
such as firms‟ owners‟ character, their managerial capabilities and the market positioning of 
a firm. The expected sign can be positive or negative. On one hand, given that the 
probability of default that we use resulted from the combinations of hard information and 
specific private information about the firm, we can conjecture that the bank will prefer to 
make business with those firms that have a lower risk of default. Therefore, those 
relationships are the ones that we expected to be long-lasting. On the other hand, the 
economic literature suggests that banks use relationship technology to fund young and more 
risky firms (Petersen and Rajan; 1995). Likewise, firms with a higher probability of failure 
should suffer more from informational hold-up problems which mean that such firms rely 
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more on the relationship lending (Rajan, 1992; Santos and Winton; 2008). Therefore, we 
may also expect that firms with high probability of default try to keep longer relationships 
with the bank. 
We also include a variable that proxies for the firm‟s transparency (Transparency). 
It is a dummy variable that takes value 1 when the legal status of the company requires a 
board of directors and a periodic publication of audited financial statements. The 
underlying idea is that transparent firms relay less on the bank relationship given their 
ability to build easily a new tie with another lender. Also, banks use relationship technology 
mainly with opaque firms (Berger and Udell; 2006). Thereby, we expect a firm‟s 
transparency to lower the duration of the relationship. 
Regarding the characteristics of the bank, we employ the market share of corporate 
loans (MktShare) as a proxy for the bank‟s market power, the Lerner index (LernerIndex) to 
control for the level of banking competition.
4
 The Lerner index is a commonly used 
competition indicator which measures the banks‟ ability to price their products above their 
marginal cost. The index takes a value between zero and one: zero in the situation of perfect 
competition and one in the case of monopoly. Hence, the index decreases as the degree of 
competition increases. As for (MktShare) variable we use the latest data produced by the 
French Central Bank and available for the loan officer at the time of assessment. The 
bank‟s market power represents an important factor that can produce the ending of the bank 
relationship through its influence on bank‟s pricing of firms‟ loan, the "hold-up problem" 
(Sharpe, 1990; Rajan, 1992). However, building a relationship with customers is costly and 
banks must have warranties to achieve the required return on investment and keep the 
customer in relationship at least until they cover the cost. Thereby, Petersen and Rajan 
                                               
4
 We compute the Lerner index of the bank from which we retrieved data as the difference between price of 
total assets and marginal costs of total assets expressed as a percentage of price of total assets:  
. The price of total assets Pit is calculated as the ratio of the bank revenue to total 
assets; the marginal costs Cmit are estimated from a translog cost function with a single output (total assets), 
three inputs (the fund costs, capital costs and labor cost) and three netputs (fixed assets, provisions for “bad” 
debts and capital). See appendix A for a detailed specification of the translog function used. 
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(1995) provide theoretical and empirical evidence supporting the hypothesis that market 
concentration is a necessary condition for a financial institution to use the relationship 
technology, though Degryse and Ongena (2007) provide evidence that market power and 
relationships are not necessarily inimical. Therefore, it is difficult to anticipate the effect of 
this variable on the probability to terminate the relationship because both positive and 
negative signs are possible. By similar reasons, it is also difficult to predict the impact of 
the level of banking competition on the duration of banking-firm relationships. 
The other important element that can influence the duration of bank-firm 
relationships are the pricing conditions proposed by the bank to their clients. Therefore, we 
use variable (BankIncome) which controls for the whole lender income from its 
relationships with each firm over the last twelve months before the date of loan officers‟ 
assessment of the corporate. Likewise, it would be interesting to test the effect of different 
components of the bank‟s earnings from its relationships on the respective duration of these 
relations. So, we consider the net earnings of the bank from its relation with the firm 
including all sources of the bank revenue such as its prior credit extension (BKIncCrdMLT 
and BKIncCrdST), its saving services (BKIncSaving), and the sale of arm's length services 
to the firm (BKIncArm). On one hand, returns from credit and saving activities might be 
negatively related to the likelihood of those relationships ending, while on the other hand, 
bank‟s revenue from the arm‟s length services sale to corporates might be positively related 
to the duration of those relationships. Indeed, intensive credit and saving activities between 
the bank and its client demonstrate a strong link between the two parties given their 
informational contribution for the lender which means that they tend to last longer when the 
bank‟s earnings are higher. However, an important component of bank‟s income from 
transactional activities with the firm (BKIncArm) shows that the tie between the two parts is 
rather a transactions-based lending which weakens the bank-firm relationship and increases 
the likelihood of its termination. 
Additionally, we also consider some additional variables that characterize the bank-
firm relationship: the number of bank relationships of the firm (Relations), the bank‟s share 
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of the total firm‟s banking debt (FinShare), a proxy of the physical distance between the 
firm and the bank (Distance) and two variables for the assessment of the firms quality 
concerning the respective “soft” and “hard” information collected by the bank (SoftInfo and 
HardInfo). 
The influence of the number of bank relationships of the firm on the bank-firm 
relationship duration is based on the assumption that maintaining an exclusive bank 
relationship strengthens the tie between the financial institution and the customer (Degryse 
and van Cayseele, 2000; Cutugno et al., 2013). Indeed, exclusivity softens the competition 
for the relational bank, makes it the only bank with access to firm specific information and 
allows it to benefit from the economic advantages associated with relationship technology. 
Thakor (1996) proves theoretically that the existence of multiple relationships reduces the 
value of information acquisition by any one bank. Therefore, we expect that the higher the 
number of relations, the lower the bonds between the bank and the firms will be and, 
therefore, the higher will be the probability of the bank-firm relationship ending. 
Another important conditioning element of the bank-firm relationship is the bank‟s 
share of total debt financing of a firm (Elsas, 2005). A higher share of banking credit 
supplied to the firm by the financial institution is a sign of a particular, strong and intensive 
tie between the firm and the bank. Indeed, a high level of credit transactions between the 
bank and the firms allows more acquisition of valuable information and, therefore, 
enhances the bargaining power of the lender by increasing the switching cost of the 
borrower in case he tries to substitute the lender for another bank. Hence, we conjecture 
that the higher the value of this financial share is, the longer the duration of the respective 
relationship will be. 
It is important to note that the number of creditors of the firm is often a corporate 
decision, so we use the number of bank relationships of the firm (Relations) as demand-side 
determinants of the firm-bank relationships. At the same time, we control for supply-side 
determinants of lender-firm relationship by using the share of banking credit supplied to the 
firm by the financial institution (FinShare). 
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Nevertheless, another important factor that may influence the bank-firm 
relationship‟s duration – which has been widely discussed in financial literature – is the 
geographical distance between the financial institution and the customer. Two channels of 
physical distance through which it may affect the bank-firm relationship duration are 
identified by banking theory: the informational channel (Hauswald and Marquez, 2006) and 
the transactional costs channel (Sussman and Zeira, 1995). However, the two strands of the 
economic theory assume that distance decreases the tie between a bank and a potential 
client. To consider the effect of distance on the duration of the bank-firm relationship, we 
introduce a dummy variable that takes value 1 when the headquarters of the firm are not in 
the same department (French administrative geographical division) of the loan officer‟s 
branch of the bank and 0 otherwise (Distance). We expect that the longer the distance is 
between them, the shorter will be the relationship. 
We also control for the information that the bank gathers about their costumers, in 
particular, regarding the assessment it makes on the firm‟s quality using private information 
collected by loan officers (“soft” information) and regarding the credit score it assigns to 
the firms based on audited financial statements (“hard” information). We expect a negative 
sign for the coefficient on the first one, but a positive for the second. 
To complete our analysis, we include in the model a proxy to control for the 
economic environment at the date when the loan officer analyses the firms‟ 
creditworthiness. The variable used is the monthly sentiment index for the business climate 
(BusClimate). This variable is computed by French National Institute of Statistics and 
Economic Studies (INSEE) for each type of industry to control for the general economic 
environment that firms confront. The business climate of the firm's activity sector is an 
important element to anticipate the borrower‟s future financial health and his ability to 
repay loans. For this reason we add the Business Climate Index control variable which is a 
leading indicator for economic activity in France, prepared by the French National Institute 
of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE). We expect a positive sign for the coefficient 
on this variable because when the economic environment deteriorates, some firms are 
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expected to have more difficulties in obtaining revenues and resources to finance their 
activity. Hence they tend to rely more on banking loans to face those cash-flow difficulties 
(e.g. Cotugno et al., 2013). This means that they will depend more on their relationship 
with the bank, which may increase the likelihood of a long term bank-firm relationship. The 
banks also have interest in keeping this relationship given that they expect to profit from 
the respective loans they concede (Santos and Winton, 2008). 
The descriptive statistics for these variables are presented in Table 2. For each one 
we have the number of episodes or relationships identified (No. Obs.), their mean duration 
(Mean), standard deviation (Std. Dev.), minimum (Min.) and maximum (Max.). The groups 
of large firms (LargeFirm) and medium and small firms (MSFirm) are also considered 
separately in this analysis. 
 
[Insert Table 2 around here] 
 
We are able to identify 1185 bank-firm relationships, 303 with large firms and 882 
with medium and small ones. By organizing the data in spells – where a spell represents the 
number of months a bank-firm relationship lasts and it is denoted by Dur – we can compute 
their mean duration. These relationships last on average around 111 months, but they last 
longer in the group of medium and small firms (about 114 months, on average) than in the 
group of large firms (around 105 months, on average). Whether there is any significant 
difference or not in the duration of bank-firm relationships between these two groups of 
firms is something that we will test below in the empirical analysis by including the dummy 
LargeFirm in the model. Moreover, some separate regressions for each of these groups will 
also be considered, without and with the additional variables. 
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5. Empirical Results 
The empirical results from the estimation of the basic Weibull model and from its 
change-point version are presented in this section. Some robustness checks are also 
provided in the end of this section. 
 
5.1. The baseline model 
The empirical evidence from the estimation of the basic Weibull model presented in 
sub-Section 3.2 is shown in Tables 3 and 4. The regressions in Table 3 are oriented simply 
to control for duration dependence; in Table 4 are considered the additional regressors. We 
start this analysis noticing that the estimate of p measures the magnitude of the duration 
dependence and γ corresponds to the estimate of the constant term. A one-sided test is used 
to detect the presence of positive duration dependence (i.e. whether p>1) and the sign '+' 
indicates significance at a 5% level. 
The results reported in Table 3 provide strong evidence of positive duration 
dependence for bank-firm relationships (p is statistically greater than 1). This means that 
the likelihood of a bank-firm relationship ending increases as the time goes by. This is valid 
not only for the basic regressions presented in column 1, but also for the following ones. 
Another interesting aspect to consider is the rate at which the respective likelihood evolves: 
p is in most of the cases statistically lower than 2, which means that the statistical analysis 
of the second-order derivative of the baseline hazard function indicates the presence of 
decreasing positive duration dependence. Putting it differently, the probability of bank-firm 
relationships ending at time t, given that they lasted until that moment, increase over time at 
a decreasing rate.
5
 
 
[Insert Table 3 around here] 
 
                                               
5
 See Castro (2010, 2013) for details on the analysis of the second-order derivative for the baseline hazard 
function. 
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We started by assuming that bank-firm relationships may have a length from one 
quarter to the maximum observable in our sample. However, their minimum duration is 
higher than one (it is six – see Table 2). Therefore, in our duration analysis it will be 
interesting to evaluate whether truncating at the minimum duration affects the results or 
not. This means that the hazard rate must be identically zero for the first months and some 
non-zero value thereafter. Truncation is made at the minimum observable durations: 
d0=min(di)-1, where min(di) is the shortest duration observed in the sample (six, in our 
case). This means that the survival function is now: 
)]exp()(exp[),( 0 βxx i
pp
iii dttS     (16) 
Truncation is allowed for in the regression presented in Column 2 of Table 3, but 
the results are not affected by this "small" truncation: decreasing positive duration 
dependence is still present in bank-credit relationships. In general, results in this kind of 
studies have not shown sensitive to the choice of this minimum observable duration and the 
qualitative conclusions tend to be identical in any case.
6
 Thus, we carry on with our 
analysis without taking into account this intricacy in the model. 
In the regressions presented in column 1, we also assume that the population of 
individual spells is homogeneous, i.e. each relationship is under the same risk of ending. 
Supposing that this might not represent the reality, the regressions in column 3 allow for the 
presence of unobserved heterogeneity or frailty.
7
 In order to include frailty in the Weibull 
model, the hazard function expressed in equation (3) is modified as follows: 
),()|,( xx tvhvth       (17) 
where v is an unobserved individual-spell effect that scales the no-frailty component. The 
random variable v is assumed to be positive with unity mean, finite variance (θ) and 
independently distributed from t and x. 
                                               
6 See, for example, Sichel (1991), Layton and Smith (2007) and Castro (2010, 2013). 
7 In statistical terms, a frailty model is similar to a random-effects model for duration analysis: it represents an 
unobserved random proportionality factor that modifies the hazard function of an individual spell and 
accounts for heterogeneity caused by unmeasured covariates or measurement errors. 
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Since the values of v are not observed, we cannot estimate them. Therefore, we 
follow Lancaster (1990) and assume v follows a Gamma distribution with unity mean and 
variance θ. Consequently, the frailty hazard function becomes: 
 )],|,()[,(),|,( xxx tSthth     (18) 
where the frailty survival function is )/1()],(ln1[),|,(   xx tStS . 
Hence, the variance parameter (θ), which measures the presence (or absence) of 
unobserved heterogeneity, is an additional parameter that needs to be estimated.
8
 The 
results show some evidence of unobserved heterogeneity: at a 5% level we do not reject the 
presence of frailty. This can be due to the omission of some relevant conditionings. 
According to Jenkins (2005, p. 81) omitted variables are one reason for the presence of 
frailty in the model. Hence, in the next regressions, especially in Table 4, we will control 
for that problem including some additional regressors in the equation.
9
 
In particular, frailty might be linked to the presence of individual firm-specific 
effects in the model. However, Claessens et al. (2011, p.17) points out that having only a 
limited number of observations/spells per individual – which is our case: we have only one 
duration spell for each firm – fixed effects may have to be ruled out. However, a way of 
partially circumvent this limitation is to consider two sets of firms that are considered to 
present some homogeneity inside each group, but that are heterogeneous between then: 
large firms and small and medium firms. This procedure (partially) solves the problems 
faced with the use of individual-dummies – controlling for eventual individual or group 
                                               
8 As θ is always greater than zero, the limiting distribution of the maximum-likelihood estimate of θ is a 
normal distribution that is halved or chopped-off at the zero-bound. Therefore, the likelihood ratio test used to 
detect its presence is a `boundary' test that takes in account the fact that the null distribution is not the usual 
chi-squared with one degree of freedom, but rather a mixture of a chi-squared with no degrees of freedom and 
a chi-squared with one degree of freedom (Gutierrez et al., 2001). 
9 Furthermore, we should stress that when we tried to control for frailty with those additional regressors in the 
model we did not achieve convergence. Therefore, we had to proceed our analysis with the more 
parsimonious structure for the Weibull model. 
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heterogeneity – and allow us to test for differences in the mean duration of the bank-firm 
relationships between those two groups of countries. 
Thus, in regression 4, we add the dummy variable LargeFirm to the model. As 
expected, the coefficient associated to this variable is positive, which provides an indication 
that, on average, bank-firm relationships are shorter when the firm is large.
10
 This result is 
in line with what we have observed in the descriptive statistics, however, the coefficient on 
LargeFirm is not statistically significant. The separate regressions for large firms and 
medium and small firms presented in columns 5 and 6, respectively, point out in the same 
direction in what regards to the magnitude of the duration dependence parameter: both 
groups present evidence of decreasing positive duration dependence. In fact, the rate at 
which bank-firm relationships end in these groups of firms is slightly the same. However, 
the coefficient on the constant is (higher and) statistically significant only in the group of 
small and medium firms. This may indicate that some differences between these two groups 
might in fact exist and that they might be significant. In order to analyse that issue in 
greater detail, we proceed the analysis including some additional conditionings in the 
model. 
In Table 4 are shown the results from the Weibull model with additional regressors. 
Despite the inclusion of those covariates, positive duration dependence is still 
characterising the bank-firm relationships. However, the magnitude of the parameter p has 
increased: constant or increasing positive duration dependence is now observed. This is not 
a surprising result because, as Jenkins (2005) notices, when relevant regressors are not 
included in the model the duration dependence parameter tends to be downward biased. 
The first group of regressors to be included in the model relates to the firms 
characteristics (see column 1). The results indicate that only the coefficients on LargeFirm, 
FirmAge, LnTurn and LnProfit are statistically significant and confirm the findings of 
Ongena and Smith (2001a). Indeed, by controlling for some additional characteristics, we 
                                               
10
 Note that a positive coefficient means a higher probability of an event ending over time, i.e. a shorter 
duration; a negative coefficient means the opposite. 
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are able to find significant evidence that, on average, bank-firm relationships are shorter 
when a firm is large. This result is consistent with what we expected given that banks 
mainly used transactions technologies to deal with large firms instead of relationship 
lending technology (e.g. Berger and Udell, 2002; Berger and Udell, 2006). This proves that 
the observed difference in the mean duration of bank-firm relationships, between large, 
medium and small firms observed in the descriptive statistics, is indeed statistically 
significant. 
Furthermore, both, the older firms and the firms with higher turnovers and profits 
tend to form stronger and longer lasting bonds with the bank. Thus, it seems that those less 
risky firms benefit from better pricing conditions than those which are younger and smaller, 
and hence suffer less from the information monopoly of bank. Indeed, the small and 
relatively recent firms are credit constrained as a result of their opacity (Petersen and Rajan, 
1995, Sakai et al., 2010). This also might be the consequence of the mutual interest of the 
bank and of these firms in maintaining their relationship, provided the benefits they can 
obtain from each other. Regarding the sector in which they are operating and the probability 
of default, no relevant results are found. Furthermore, our proxy of the firm‟s transparency 
(Transparency) does not seem to play a significant role on the duration of these 
relationships. It is possible that other variables such as firm‟s age, size, turnover and profit 
capture this effect. 
 
[Insert Table 4 around here] 
 
When specific characteristics of the bank are considered in the model (regression 2, 
in Table 4), we observe that the coefficients on the market share and Lerner index are 
statistically significant, both with a positive sign.
11
 Hence, the higher the local bank‟s 
market power and the higher the Lerner index (i.e. the lower the banking competition), the 
                                               
11 We also tried to include the square of these variables in the model, but the respective coefficients have not 
proved to be statistically significant. The results are not reported here to save space, but they are available 
upon request. 
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higher the likelihood of the bank-firm relationship breakdown will be. Our results are 
consistent with the empirical outcomes of Elsas (2005) regarding the effect of bank market 
power on the relationship lending. We support the theoretical prediction that higher market 
power allows the bank to extract rents from lending over the duration of the relationship – 
the "hold-up problem" – (Sharpe, 1990; Rajan, 1992). So, the solution for firms to avoid 
this “informational capture” is to make the relationship shorter (Rajan, 1992). According to 
our results, poorer banking competition works in the same direction, which supports the 
outcomes of Degryse and Ongena (2007). 
As for the pricing conditions or, more specifically, for bank‟s earnings from its 
relationships, no relevant effects are found for the aggregate variable BankIncome, but 
interesting findings are provided for its components in accordance with our predictions. On 
one hand, short-term credit and savings revenues are, as expected, negatively linked to the 
likelihood of a relationship ending. In fact, they tend to last longer because intensive credit 
and saving activities between the bank and the firm promotes the collection of information 
which enhances the tie between them. On the other hand, higher bank‟s revenues from 
arm‟s length services sales to firms contribute to shorter relationships given that its low 
contribution to the collection of private information. 
We should also notice that the other results are not affected by the inclusion of these 
bank-specific variables, with the exception of DefaultProb which has know a statistically 
significant coefficient, showing that it has a negative impact on the likelihood of a 
relationship ending. In fact, it seems that when the probability of default increases, firms 
tend to become more dependent on the bank. Indeed, risky firms face more difficulties to 
find another source of funding, which increases their reliance on existing lending 
relationship. Therefore, these firms are more prone to informational monopoly and to the 
“hold-up” problem and accept to undergo very strict pricing conditions which fit the bank‟s 
convenience (Rajan, 1992; Santos and Winton; 2008). 
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As for the control variables on the bank-firm relationship, the number of bank‟s 
relationships has shown no impact on the duration of relationships (see column 4), which 
contrasts with the findings of Ongena and Smith (2001a). Nonetheless, our findings 
confirm those of Elsas (2005) and show that the number of firms‟ creditors does not 
influence the duration of the relationship between the bank and firms. 
We also find that when the bank‟s share of total firm indebtedness is higher, the 
bank-firm relationship tends to last longer. As expected, a higher share of banking loan 
supplied to the firm indicates that the business bonds between the bank and the firm are 
stronger and deeper, and allows for more acquisition of valuable information which 
enhances the tie between the borrower and the lender. Therefore, consistent with Elsas 
(2005), we find that bank‟s share of total debt financing of a firm is an important 
conditioning element of the bank-firm relationship. 
The distance variable presents a positive effect on the likelihood of the bank-firm 
relationships ending, but its coefficient has not proved to be statistically significant. This 
means that the location of the firm is not as relevant to the duration of the relationship as 
sustained by Hauswald and Marquez (2006) trough the informational channel theory or by 
Sussman and Zeira (1995) via the transactional costs channel theory. 
Additionally, we also control for the information that the bank gathers about their 
costumers and concluded that only the “soft” information – i.e. the loan officer‟s 
assessment of the firm‟s quality – is relevant to explain the duration of the relationship: as 
expected, a better assessment contributes to a stronger and longer relationship. We also note 
that the other results were not affect with the inclusion of these bank-firm relationship 
variables. 
Finally, in the regression 5, we also control for the business climate. As expected, 
we observe a positive relation with the likelihood of a bank-firm relationship ending. 
However, the coefficient on this variable is not statistically significant. In an additional 
regression not reported here, we also tried to collect this effect using a broader (dummy) 
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variable for the periods of recession in France, but it has not proved to be relevant either.
12
 
This means that the economic environment is not detrimental to the duration of such 
particular relationships. Other specific characteristics to the firms, to the bank and to their 
relationships, as well as their duration, are much more important to justify the length of 
those relationships. 
In regression 6, we only include those variables that have significant coefficients in 
the previous regressions. The results are consistent with what we have described so far, 
therefore, this has been used as a benchmark model for the remaining part of this study. In 
columns 6 and 7 we present the results for the groups of large firms and medium and small 
firms, respectively. They confirm the presence of positive duration dependence in both 
groups of the firms (constant in the first group and increasing in the second), however, 
some differences are noticed regarding the other control variables. 
Regarding the firms‟ characteristics, we observe that the age of the firm is relevant 
for both groups. However, the turnover, profitability and default probability only influences 
the duration of bank‟s relationship with small and medium firms; these variables are no 
longer relevant when large firms are taken into account. These results are consistent with 
our previous findings and confirm that small-and medium-sized enterprises (SME) are 
more likely to undergo “informational capture” by the lender and therefore rely more on the 
relationship technology. Additionally, bank-specific characteristics have proved to 
influence small and medium firms‟ relationships significantly and in the same direction as 
the one identified for all firms in the previous regressions. However, large firms‟ 
relationships only tend to last longer when banking competition is not very intense and 
bank rents from credit and saving operations are higher. Moreover, the bank-firm 
relationship variables are not relevant when the analysis considers those large firms. For 
medium and small firms we confirm the increase in the length of bank-firm relationships 
when FinShare is higher and SoftInfo improves. 
 
                                               
12 The respective results are available upon request. 
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5.2. The model with change-points in duration dependence 
The results presented in Tables 3 and 4 rely on the assumption that the magnitude of 
the duration dependence parameter is invariant whatever the duration of the bank-firm 
relationships. In Figures 1 to 3, we plot the survivor functions for those relationships for all 
firms (Figure 1), large firms (Figure 2) and medium and small firms (Figure 3). It can be 
seen that the probability (or proportion) of a relationship surviving after duration ti 
substantially decreases as they become older. This sharp decline is consistent with the 
existence of positive duration dependence. Moreover, the survivor functions in the three 
groups quick fall until ti=273 (about 23 years) but, then, evolve at a much slower pace. This 
highlights the possibility of breaks in duration dependence and the need of a more flexible 
framework allowing for change-points in the Weibull distribution at τc=273. In fact, 
Figures 1 to 3 suggest that the magnitude of duration dependence parameter might be lower 
when relationships are longer than this value and the likelihood of they ending can 
significantly change above that threshold. Thus, there is evidence to suspect that change-
points in the duration of bank-firm relationships may indeed exist. 
[Insert Figure 1 around here] 
[Insert Figure 2 around here] 
[Insert Figure 3 around here] 
In order to test for the presence of differences in the duration dependence parameter, 
we consider a Weibull model with a change-point. Hence, we estimate two dependence 
duration parameters, one for the first duration-period (p1) and another one for the second 
duration-period (p2), and evaluate the statistical significance of the difference between the 
two (p2-p1).
13,14
 The results are reported in Table 5. 
In column 1, we estimate a simple equation without covariates considering all the 
firms in the dataset; then, columns 2 and 3 present the results for the groups of large firms 
                                               
13
 The estimates for the two constant terms are γ1=λ1
p1 and γ2=λ2
p2. 
14 The delta method is used to compute the respective standard-errors. 
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and medium and small firms, respectively. In regressions 4 to 6, we provide the results for 
the same sets of firms, but controlling for the most relevant regressors. 
 
[Insert Table 5 around here] 
 
As expected, the results presented in Table 5 show that the duration dependence 
parameter indeed varies with the duration of the bank-firm relationships. In particular, the 
magnitude of the duration dependence parameter is always significantly lower when those 
relationships are longer than about 23 years (273 months), in either group of firms and with 
or without the additional regressors in the model. Note also that the difference between the 
parameters after and before the respective change-point (p2-p1) is always negative and 
statistically significant (except in the group of large firms).
15
 In particular, considering the 
model without additional regressors, (decreasing or constant) positive duration dependence 
is observed in those relationships that last less than 273 months, while negative duration 
dependence characterizes the relationships that last more than that threshold (except for the 
group of large firms, where no duration dependence is found after that change-point). This 
means that those relations become stronger when they last more than 23 years as the 
likelihood of them ending indeed starts to decrease after that moment onwards. 
When the additional regressors are included in the model, increasing positive 
duration dependence is observed in all regressions for relationships that last less than 23 
years, but when they last more than that threshold duration dependence is no longer present, 
i.e. the likelihood of them ending is no longer dependent on their age. Indeed, while the 
parameter p1 is statistically significant in all specifications, p2 does not exhibit statistical 
significance in any of the groups considered in our analysis. Moreover, the difference 
                                               
15 Even though Figures 1 to 3 are clear about the location of the change-points, we tried other months as 
change-points, but unsurprisingly this difference was never statistically significant in those cases. Some of 
those experiments are reported below in the robustness checks; additional experiments are available upon 
request. 
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between the two parameters remains statistically significant. Hence, we have evidence to 
argue that there is a change-point in the duration of bank-firm relationships. 
After controlling for change-points, we are still observing that the average duration 
of the bank-firm relationships is significantly higher in the group of medium and small 
firms. Regarding the other regressors, the results confirm that those relationships last 
longer: (i) when firms are older, have a higher turnover and profitability and when the 
default probability is higher; (ii) when the bank‟s market power is lower and the level of 
banking competition in higher; (iii) when pricing conditions are favourable (higher rents 
from credits and savings and lower revenues from arm‟s length sales); (iv) and when the 
bank‟s share of total firm‟s banking debt is higher and the bank‟s assessment on firm‟s 
quality improves. 
Thus, our results allow us to conclude that there is strong evidence supporting the 
presence of a change-point in the duration of bank-firm relationships, independently of the 
sub-group of firms considered, with or without additional regressors in the model. This 
represents a striking finding in this field of the literature that certainly contributes to a better 
understanding of the bank-firm relationships. 
 
5.3. Robustness checks 
When we look at the figures for the survival functions, we are able to identify two 
spells that last more than 1000 months, while the others last less than 600 months (all firms 
and medium-small firms). As these two observations can be considered outliers and might 
influence the results, we decided to exclude them from the sample and check whether our 
conclusions are affected or not. The results are presented in Table 6 (columns 1-4). The 
regressions only consider the cases where the outliers are identified: all firms and medium-
small firms. In the first two regressions, we do not control for the presence of a change-
point; it is controlled for in regressions 3 and 4. The results and conclusions of this study 
are not affected by the exclusion of those two outliers. In particular, increasing positive 
duration dependence is found for those relationships that last less than 23 years, but they 
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are no longer duration dependence when they last more than that threshold; Moreover, the 
results and conclusions obtained so far regarding the firms and bank‟s variables, the pricing 
conditions and the bank-firm relationship variables remain essentially the same. 
 
[Insert Table 6 around here] 
 
Even though Figures 1 to 3 present a clear indication about the location of the 
change-points, we tried other months as change-points. The results from one of those 
experiments are presented in the last three columns in Table 6, for all, large, and medium 
and small firms. The change-points considered here are, respectively, 225, 175 and 225 
months. Although positive duration dependence is found in the first period and no duration 
dependence is observed in the second period, the difference is not statistically significant in 
either case. Hence, we cannot consider those threshold values as change-points. 
Nonetheless, the other results and conclusions remain unchanged. 
 
6. Conclusions 
This paper analyses whether bank-firm relationships are duration dependent and 
investigates the presence of change-points in their likelihood of ending. These represent 
important avenues of research that have not been explored in the literature yet. As a way of 
filling that gap, we employ a duration model over a group of 1185 bank-firm relationships 
to investigate whether the likelihood of ending depends indeed on its own age and to check 
the presence of change-points in its behaviour. For each relationship spell we also control 
for information on the firm-level characteristics, bank market power, pricing conditions, on 
their specific individual bank-borrower relationship variables and on the economic 
environment. 
The data set used in this study, unlike previous empirical works, is much more 
comprehensive and is particularly adequate to analyse lending relationships given that it 
concern only to firms considered opaque and subject to severe informational asymmetries. 
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Further, our database considers only the French credit market, one of the majors in the EU 
economy. 
First of all, the findings of the baseline Weibull duration model applied to this study 
are consistent with those of Ongena and Smith (2001a) and show the presence of positive 
duration dependence in the bank-firm relationships, which implies that their likelihood of 
ending increases over their duration. However, these results are not in line with the 
theoretical framework of lender-firm relationship which predicts “informational capture” of 
borrowers in bank-firm relationships over time, in the asymmetric information context 
(Sharpe, 1990; von Thadden, 2004). Consistently with the results provided by Ongena and 
Smith‟s (2001a), our empirical analysis finds that the relationship duration of small, young, 
and less profitable firms is shorter. 
Our study is of particular interest, as it is the first to extend the baseline Weibull 
duration model in order to allow for breaks or change-points in the duration dependence 
parameter of lending relationships. While the basic Weibull model assumes that the 
behaviour of duration dependence is smooth (i.e. either constant, increasing or decreasing) 
over time, the degree of likelihood of a relationship ending as it gets older may change after 
a given duration. The empirical findings indeed support the presence of a change-point: 
(increasing) positive duration dependence is observed in relationships that last less than 23 
years, but then it becomes non-relevant (or even negative) for longer events. A possible 
interpretation of our results is that the probability to terminate the firm-lender relationship 
by small-and medium-sized enterprises (SME) increases with time, as a consequence of the 
rising risk of being “informationally captured” and of the increasing switching costs faced 
over time (von Thadden, 2004). However, when firms are totally locked-in to informed 
lenders and their switching costs are so high that firm can no longer change banks, the 
likelihood to end the bank-firm relationship decreases (Sharpe, 1990). In our sample, this 
happens after 23 years of bank-firm relationship. This represents an important empirical 
finding in this field of the literature and certainly contributes to a better and deeper 
understanding of the bank-firm relationships. 
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The outcomes provided by this study also indicate that bank-firm relationships are, 
on average, longer when medium and small firms are involved in the relationship, when 
firms are older, have a higher turnover and profitability and when the default probability is 
higher. A similar behaviour is found when the bank‟s market power is lower and the level 
of banking competition is higher. However, the market power of the bank loses its 
influence when only large firms are considered in regressions, which may be explained by 
their greater bargaining power (Grunert and Norden; 2012) and their low exposure to the 
informational rent “hold up problem”. The pricing conditions have also proved to be 
important for bank-firms relations: higher rents from credits and savings and lower 
revenues from arm‟s length sales tend to promote longer relationships. 
Additionally, our study shows that some specific bank-firm relationship variables, 
related to the gathering of individual private information by the bank, also play an 
important role in their duration. Our findings point out that those relationships last longer 
when the bank‟s share of total firm‟s banking debt is higher and the bank‟s assessment on 
firm‟s quality (“soft” information) improves, which is somehow in line with the work by 
Elsas (2005). Nevertheless, the number of relations and physical distance between the firm 
and the bank has not proved to affect the probability for the bank-firms relationships to 
terminate. Hence, the theoretical and empirical findings provided by Hauswald and 
Marquez (2006) and Agarwal and Hauswald (2010) on this matter are not observed in this 
particular case-study. We also analyse the impact of the economic conditions on the length 
of those relationships, but no significant influence was found on their duration.  
While providing valuable information on the duration of bank-firm relationships, 
the present paper opens new avenues for future work. For instance, given that the selection 
of the change-point is exogenously determined by a sensible graphical analysis of the 
survivor function, an interesting extension of this piece of research would be to incorporate 
a discrete latent variable in the standard Weibull model. This would make the selection of 
the change-point endogenous, thereby, representing a challenging and promising approach 
to be considered in the future. 
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Another possible extension is related to the dataset. Considering other banks in the 
sample and their relations with their corporate customers will enrich the analysis and 
provide further information regarding the bank-firm relationships and the banks‟ 
competition. However, it is not easy to get that information and some comparative issues 
may take difficult that analysis. Nevertheless, this is another interesting extension to be 
considered in future research. 
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Appendix A: 
 
To compute the Lerner index of the bank, we first estimate the following translog 
cost function using a single output (Total assets), three input factors (the fund costs, capital 
costs and labor cost) and three netputs (fixed assets, provisions for “bad” debts and capital) 
using data of 235 French banks over 1999-2012: 
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(19) 
 
 
Where TC denoted the bank total costs which are a function of outputs (Q), estimated by 
the total assets. W is the vector of inputs (the funds cost (W1), capital cost (W2) and labor 
cost (W3)), and netputs are represented by the vector Z (fixed assets, (Z1) provisions for 
“bad” debts, (Z2), and equity capital (Z3)). Standard homogeneity conditions are imposed by 
scaling all total costs and inputs factors by the labor price and the heterogeneity are 
corrected by dividing by equity capital (Z3). We obtained the marginal costs using the 
estimated parameters of the translog function by calculating the derivative with respect to 
total assets (Q) as follows: 
 
𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑡  =  
𝜕  𝑇𝐶
𝜕  𝑄
=  
𝑇𝐶𝑖𝑡
𝑄
  𝛽1 +  𝛽2𝑙𝑛𝑄𝑖𝑡 +  ∅𝑘 𝑙𝑛𝑊𝑘 ,𝑖𝑡
3
𝑘=1    (20) 
 
 
We use the stochastic frontier approach (SFA) to estimate the translog function (Koetter et 
al., 2012). We also add years dummy to consider the effects of technical change on costs 
over time.  
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List of Tables 
Table 1. Description of the variables, expected signs and sources 
Variables Description Signs 
   
Dur Duration of the Bank-Firm relationship, in months.  
LargeFirm Dummy variable that takes value 1 when the firm is large (with mode than 250 employees); 
0, otherwise (medium and small firms). 
+ 
FirmAge Age of the firm, in years. – / + 
Trade Dummy variable that takes value 1 when the firm is operating in the commerce sector; 0, 
otherwise. 
– / + 
Indus Dummy variable that takes value 1 when the firm is operating in the industrial sector; 0, 
otherwise. 
– / + 
Serv Dummy variable that takes value 1 when the firm is operating in the services sector; 0, 
otherwise. 
– / + 
Constr Dummy variable that takes value 1 when the firm is operating in the  construction sector; 0, 
otherwise. 
– / + 
AAI Dummy variable that takes value 1 when the firm is operating in the  agriculture or agri-food 
industry sector; 0, otherwise. 
– / + 
LnTurn Logarithm of the firm‟s turnover (thousands of euros). – 
LnProfit Logarithm of the firm‟s profitability, i.e. the log of the EBITDA over the net value of total 
assets (both in thousands of euros); this ratio was truncated to zero when negative. 
– 
DefaultProb Default probability (the result of bank‟s internal rating taking into account soft and hard 
information for the firm). 
– / + 
Transparency Proxy of firms‟ transparency, dummy variable that takes value 1 when the legal 
status of the company requires a board of directors and a periodic publication of 
audited financial statements; 0, otherwise. 
+ 
MktShare Bank‟s market share of corporate loans (in percentage), i.e. market power of bank in the 
geographical location of the firm. 
– / + 
LernerIndex The Lerner index to control for the level of banking competition (in percentage). – / + 
BankIncome Net banking income or rent, i.e. the total amount of the whole relationships earnings for the 
bank during the last 12 months (in thousands of euros), which is computed as follows: 
Net banking income = NBI_Credit_MLT + NBI_Credit_ST + NBI_Saving + Arm's 
Length_NBI 
where: 
- NBI_Credit_MLT (BkIncCrdMLT) is the amount of the bank's revenue from medium 
and long-term credit activities with the firms during the last 12 months. 
- NBI_Credit_ST (BkIncCrdST) is the amount of the bank's revenue from short-term credit 
activities with the firms during the last 12 months. 
- NBI_Saving (BkIncSaving) is the amount of the bank's revenue from the saving 
relationship activities with the firms during the last12 months. 
- Arm's Length_NBI (BkIncArm) is the amount of the bank's revenue from arm‟s length 
services sale to SME during the last 12 months. 
– / + 
 
 
 
 
– 
 
– 
 
– 
 
+ 
Relations Dummy variable that takes value 1 when the number of the firms‟ bank relationships is 
greater than 1 (multibancarity); 0, otherwise (exclusivity). 
+ 
FinShare Bank‟s share of the total firm‟s banking debt from (0-1 scale). – 
Distance Dummy variable that takes value 1 when the headquarters of the firm is not in the same 
location of the loan officer‟s branch of the bank; 0, otherwise. 
+ 
SoftInfo Loan officer‟s assessment of non-financial firm‟s quality expressed on a score from 0 (the 
worst) to 20 (the best). 
– 
HardInfo An internal credit scoring based on audited financial statements, scaled from 0 (the worst) to 
20 (the best). 
+ 
BusClimate Business climate obtained from French monthly business sentiments index regarding 
different business sectors. 
+ 
   
Sources: The definitions of the variables presented in this table relate to a sample of 1185 individual bank-borrower 
relationships for the period 2008-2013. These are the firms in the loan officer‟s credit reports of the bank from which we 
collect data. The loan officer‟s credit report is the loan officer annual assessment of firm's credit worthiness. The credit 
reports contain information about the duration of relationship (Dur), the kind of relationship (Relations), firms‟ default 
probability (DefaultProb), the net banking income and its different components (BankIncome, BkIncCrdMLT, 
BkIncCrdST, BKIncSaving, BKIncArm), the loan officer‟s assessment of firm‟s quality (SoftInfo), the outcome of internal 
credit scoring system based on financial informations (HardInfo) the location of company headquarters (Distance), the 
share of the total firm‟s banking debt at the date of assessment (FinShare), the firms' sector of activity (Trade, Indus, Serv, 
Constr, AAI). Data on the bank‟s market share of corporate loans in the geographical location of the firm‟s (MktShare) 
was gathered from the bank, this information is quarterly data provided by the French Central Bank to each bank granting 
credit at the level of French department (geographical location). Data on the business climate (BusClimate) are computed 
by France‟s National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE). We use DIANE database for FirmAge, 
LnTurn, LNProfit, LargeFirm and Transparency, a dataset about French firms to access information on firm‟s specific 
characteristics and firm‟s balance sheets data. We use the SIREN number (a nine-figure identifier attributed to each firm 
by France's National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies) to identify each firm.  LernerIndex is the result of our 
calculation using Bankscope database.   
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
Variables No. Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
      
Dur 1185 111.2 90.35 6 1366 
Dur if LargeFirm 303 104.6 66.28 15 532 
Dur if MSFirm 882 113.5 97.18 6 1366 
LargeFirm 1185 0.256 0.436 0 1 
FirmAge 1185 24.00 21.18 1.770 113.2 
Trade 1185 0.254 0.435 0 1 
Indus 1185 0.159 0.366 0 1 
Serv 1185 0.418 0.493 0 1 
Constr 1185 0.098 0.297 0 1 
AAI 1185 0.053 0.224 0 1 
LnTurn 1107 7.947 1.984 -1.609 14.52 
LnProfit 1185 4.910 7.135 0 59.49 
DefaultProb 1133 0.074 0.206 0 1 
Transparency 1181 0.122 0.327 0 1 
MktShare (%) 1185 41.47 0.774 40.56 44.79 
LernerIndex (%) 1071 25.04 1.857 22.53 29.46 
BankIncome 1185 7.306 15.87 -28.78 274.5 
BkIncCrdMLT 1185 1.459 7.517 -31.39 149.0 
BkIncCrdST 1185 1.263 9.737 -6.938 229.3 
BkIncSaving 1185 0.760 2.445 0.000 51.89 
BkIncArm 1185 3.824 6.654 0.011 114.9 
Relations 1185 0.892 0.311 0 1 
FinShare 1185 0.322 0.375 0 1 
Distance 1185 0.258 0.438 0 1 
SoftInfo 1185 10.58 3.351 0 20.00 
HardInfo 1185 10.41 4.131 0 19.55 
BusClimate 1185 90.56 5.597 71 109 
      
Notes: See Table1. This table reports the number of relationships (No. Obs.), their mean duration (Mean), the 
respective standard-deviation (Std. Dev.), and the minimum (Min.) and maximum (Max.) duration of those 
relationships. 
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Table 3. Basic Weibull model regressions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
γ 0.00007** 0.00009** 0.00005** 0.00007** 0.00005 0.00007** 
 (0.00003) (0.00004) (0.00003) (0.00003) (0.0004) (0.00004) 
p 1.449
+, d
 1.413
+, d
 2.183
+, c
 1.458
+, d
 1.548
+, d
 1.436
+, d
 
 (0.089) (0.095) (0.188) (0.088) (0.150) (0.100) 
θ   3.955***    
   (0.244)    
LargeFirm    0.198   
    (0.245)   
       
       
LogL -337.4 -748.7 -305.8 -337.0 -88.7 -248.2 
AIC 678.7 1501.5 627.6 680.1 181.4 500.5 
SBIC 688.9 1511.6 632.8 695.3 188.8 510.1 
Observ. 1185 1185 1185 1185 303 882 
Censored 92 92 92 92 24 68 
Notes: For sources, see Table 1. Robust standard errors clustered by firm for the estimated coefficients are in 
parentheses. Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%; and *, 10%. 
The sign “+” indicates that p is significantly higher than 1 using a 5% one-sided test with robust 
standard errors; d, c and i indicate the presence of decreasing, constant or increasing positive duration 
dependence, respectively, at a 5% level. AIC=2[-LogL+k] and SBIC=2[-LogL+(k/2)LogN], where 
LogL is the log-likelihood for the estimated model, k is the number of regressors and N is the number of 
observations. LRI is the likelihood ration index or pseudo-R2 (LRI=1-LogL/LogL0, where L0 is the 
likelihood of the model with only a constant term). “Censored” indicates de number of censored 
observations. Column (1) presents the results of a continuous-time basic Weibull model; truncation at 
the minimum value of Dur (6 months) is used in regression (2); in regression (3), frailty is controlled 
for; columns (5) and (6) present results for the group of „large‟ firms and „medium and small‟ firms, 
respectively. 
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Table 4. Weibull model regressions with additional regressors 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
γ 0.0005 0.00001 0.00001 0.00001 0.00001 0.00001 0.00001 0.00001 
 (0.0005) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) 
p 1.768+, c 2.180+, c 2.410+, i 2.698+, i 2.693+, i 2.549+, i 2.389+, c 2.760+, i 
 (0.147) (0.180) (0.213) (0.224) (0.222) (0.195) (0.293) (0.272) 
LargeFirm 0.510* 1.171*** 1.097*** 0.771** 0.756** 0.614**   
 (0.302) (0.323) (0.312) (0.322) (0.321) (0.313)   
FirmAge -0.060*** -0.048** -0.056** -0.051** -0.051** -0.056*** -0.051* -0.063** 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.022) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.029) (0.027) 
Trade -0.125 1.472* 1.261 1.341 1.345    
 (0.625) (0.858) (0.923) (0.967) (0.974)    
Indus 0.161 0.844 0.561 0.435 0.476    
 (0.657) (0.845) (0.884) (0.921) (0.939)    
Serv -0.500 0.651 0.570 0.506 0.519    
 (0.607) (0.795) (0.863) (0.926) (0.935)    
Constr 0.270 1.257 0.935 0.960 0.962    
 (0.669) (0.854) (0.888) (0.900) (0.907)    
LnTurn -0.234*** -0.222*** -0.161* -0.263*** -0.265*** -0.195** -0.099 -0.258*** 
 (0.072) (0.083) (0.084) (0.084) (0.084) (0.077) (0.151) (0.074) 
LnProfit -0.303*** -0.237*** -0.237*** -0.181** -0.181** -0.215** -0.294 -0.254* 
 (0.092) (0.069) (0.079) (0.083) (0.084) (0.090) (0.219) (0.136) 
DefaultProb -0.448 -1.288** -1.502** -1.946** -1.934** -1.903** 1.317 -2.195** 
 (0.617) (0.632) (0.722) (0.788) (0.789) (0.792) (1.776) (0.914) 
Transparency 0.256 -0.085 -0.136 -0.035 -0.032    
 (0.463) (0.423) (0.458) (0.417) (0.419)    
MktShare  0.548*** 0.656*** 0.640*** 0.673*** 0.558*** 0.097 0.674*** 
  (0.147) (0.169) (0.157) (0.184) (0.139) (0.311) (0.164) 
LernerIndex  0.554*** 0.527*** 0.484*** 0.400* 0.454*** 0.455*** 0.485*** 
  (0.101) (0.101) (0.105) (0.215) (0.087) (0.162) (0.115) 
BankIncome  -0.015       
  (0.011)       
BkIncCrdMLT   -0.030 0.017 0.018    
   (0.061) (0.026) (0.026)    
BkIncCrdST   -0.448*** -0.487*** -0.482*** -0.543*** -0.183* -0.742*** 
   (0.120) (0.121) (0.121) (0.119) (0.101) (0.203) 
BkIncSaving   -0.858** -0.846** -0.824** -0.749** -0.688* -0.459* 
   (0.394) (0.401) (0.409) (0.380) (0.354) (0.255) 
BkIncArm   0.035*** 0.031*** 0.030*** 0.027*** -0.012 0.028*** 
   (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.062) (0.010) 
Relations    -0.174 -0.184    
    (0.454) (0.456)    
FinShare    -1.800** -1.797** -1.526** -2.257 -1.441** 
    (0.700) (0.707) (0.603) (1.494) (0.735) 
Distance    0.310 0.294    
    (0.324) (0.332)    
SoftInfo    -0.059* -0.059* -0.075** 0.003 -0.091** 
    (0.032) (0.032) (0.030) (0.053) (0.037) 
HardInfo    -0.019 -0.021    
    (0.041) (0.041)    
BusClimate     0.021    
     (0.054)    
         
         
LogL -203.3 -135.5 -123.9 -111.8 -111.8 -116.5 -29.9 -79.0 
AIC 430.6 301.0 283.8 269.7 271.6 261.0 85.8 184.0 
SBIC 490.1 373.8 371.3 381.4 388.2 329.0 129.8 243.8 
LRI 0.198 0.433 0.482 0.532 0.533 0.513 0.539 0.543 
Observ. 1056 952 952 952 952 953 218 735 
Censored 63 60 60 60 60 60 17 43 
Notes: See Table 1 and Table 3. Columns (7) and (8) present separate results for the group of „large‟ firms and „medium 
and small‟ firms, respectively. 
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Table 5. Weibull model regressions with a change-point 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
γ1 0.0019*** 0.0018*** 0.0020*** 0.0368*** 0.0051*** 0.3520** 
 (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0051) (0.0168) (0.1504) 
γ2 0.0001 0.0012 0.00001 0.2292 0.0064*** 0.7273 
 (0.0002) (0.0010) (0.00006) (0.6407) (0.0025) (3.8252) 
p1 1.753
+, d 1.613+, d 1.805+, c 2.633+, i 2.808+, c 2.862+, i 
 (0.085) (0.149) (0.101) (0.200) (0.529) (0.289) 
p2 0.308 
– 0.994 0.189 – 1.469 1.306 1.721 
 (0.194) (0.773) (0.176) (0.919) (0.716) (1.031) 
p2-p1 -1.445*** -0.619 -1.616*** -1.164** 1.025 -1.141* 
 (0.216) (0.789) (0.209) (0.529) (0.719) (0.586) 
LargeFirm    0.585*   
    (0.318)   
FirmAge    -0.056*** -0.056* -0.063** 
    (0.022) (0.032) (0.028) 
LnTurn    -0.187** -0.163 -0.250*** 
    (0.079) (0.175) (0.076) 
LnProfit    -0.223** -0.171* -0.263* 
    (0.092) (0.092) (0.136) 
DefaultProb    -1.916**  -2.222** 
    (0.804)  (0.937) 
MktShare    0.544*** 0.150 0.655*** 
    (0.141) (0.266) (0.165) 
LernerIndex    0.441*** 0.484*** 0.467*** 
    (0.087) (0.162) (0.113) 
BkIncCrdST    -0.527*** -0.282* -0.735*** 
    (0.120) (0.155) (0.203) 
BkIncSaving    -0.749** -0.744* -0.470* 
    (0.374) (0.408) (0.251) 
BkIncArm    0.027*** 0.020* 0.028*** 
    (0.010) (0.107) (0.010) 
FinShare    -1.472** -2.144 -1.393* 
    (0.587) (1.320) (0.716) 
SoftInfo    -0.073** -0.007 -0.088** 
    (0.031) (0.050) (0.038) 
       
       
LogL -740.3 -193.1 -546.2 -379.7 -125.2 -269.8 
AIC 1486.6 392.2 1098.5 791.4 278.5 569.6 
SBIC 1501.8 403.3 1112.8 869.2 327.0 638.6 
Observ. 1185 303 882 953 236 735 
Censored 92 24 68 60 18 43 
Notes: See Table 1 and Table 3. A change-point at duration 273 is tested in all regressions. The symbol “–“ 
means negative duration dependence. Columns (5) and (6) present separate results for the group of „large‟ 
firms and „medium and small‟ firms, respectively. 
 
  45 
 
Table 6. Robustness checks 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        
γ1 0.00001 0.00001 0.0369*** 0.3521** 0.0284*** 0.0484 0.0309 
 (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.0050) (0.1502) (0.0023) (0.2262) (0.0841) 
γ2   0.2294 0.7272 0.0367* 0.0177 0.0367 
   (0.6403) (3.8250) (0.0223) (0.0416) (0.1162) 
p1 2.611
+, i 2.846+, i 2.633+, i 2.863+, i 2.591+, i 2.775+, c 2.798+, i 
 (0.203) (0.293) (0.200) (0.290) (0.198) (0.537) (0.285) 
p2   1.470 1.724 2.278
+, c 2.237+, c 2.570+, c 
   (0.926) (1.029) (0.608) (0.881) (0.667) 
p2-p1   -1.163** -1.139* -0.312 -0.538 -0.227 
   (0.528) (0.587) (0.624) (0.801) (0.694) 
LargeFirm 0.597*  0.586*  0.599*   
 (0.316)  (0.318)  (0.318)   
FirmAge -0.058*** -0.067** -0.057*** -0.065** -0.056*** -0.050* -0.063** 
 (0.022) (0.028) (0.022) (0.029) (0.021) (0.028) (0.027) 
LnTurn -0.185** -0.245*** -0.184** -0.246*** -0.192** -0.099 -0.255*** 
 (0.080) (0.076) (0.080) (0.076) (0.078) (0.149) (0.074) 
LnProfit -0.222** -0.262** -0.224** -0.263** -0.218** -0.325 -0.256* 
 (0.091) (0.134) (0.092) (0.134) (0.091) (0.264) (0.136) 
DefaultProb -1.928** -2.240** -1.922** -2.235** -1.916** -1.393 -2.205** 
 (0.807) (0.937) (0.806) (0.939) (0.798) (1.933) (0.925) 
MktShare 0.553*** 0.664*** 0.546*** 0.658*** 0.551*** 0.096 0.667*** 
 (0.137) (0.161) (0.140) (0.164) (0.140) (0.323) (0.165) 
LernerIndex 0.441*** 0.467*** 0.439*** 0.464*** 0.449*** 0.470*** 0.480*** 
 (0.087) (0.112) (0.087) (0.113) (0.088) (0.171) (0.118) 
BkIncCrdST -0.537*** -0.744*** -0.529*** -0.739*** -0.536*** -0.190* -0.741*** 
 (0.119) (0.202) (0.121) (0.203) (0.121) (0.107) (0.203) 
BkIncSaving -0.743** -0.472* -0.745** -0.473* -0.747** -0.544* -0.461* 
 (0.362) (0.247) (0.366) (0.248) (0.381) (0.281) (0.255) 
BkIncArm 0.027*** 0.028*** 0.027*** 0.028*** 0.027*** -0.011 0.028*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.060) (0.010) 
FinShare -1.510*** -1.424** -1.481** -1.404* -1.499** -2.284 -1.423* 
 (0.590) (0.719) (0.589) (0.719) (0.597) (1.538) (0.729) 
SoftInfo -0.074** -0.089** -0.073** -0.088** -0.075** 0.005 -0.090** 
 (0.031) (0.037) (0.031) (0.038) (0.030) (0.052) (0.037) 
        
        
LogL -115.7 -78.3 -379.5 -269.6 -380.3 -102.3 -270.3 
AIC 259.5 182.7 791.1 569.2 792.6 232.5 568.5 
SBIC 327.5 242.5 868.8 638.1 870.3 279.9 632.9 
LRI 0.512 0.542 -- -- -- -- -- 
Observ. 952 734 952 734 953 218 735 
Censored 60 43 60 43 60 17 43 
Notes: See previous tables for further details. Columns (1) to (4) exclude those (outlier) relationships that last 
more than fifty years (600 months); Regressions 1 and 3 consider all the firms; regressions 2 and 4 
consider only the medium and small firms. In columns (5) to (7) are considered different change-points; 
those are, respectively: 225 months for all firms (regression 5); 175 months for large firms (regression 
6); and 225 months for medium and small firms (regression 7). 
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Figure 2. Survivor functions: large firms 
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Figure 3. Survivor functions: medium-small firms 
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